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The emergence of electronic computers in the last thirty years has given rise to many 
interesting questions. Many of these questions are technical, relating to a machine’s 
ability to perform complex operations in a variety of circumstances. While some of these 
questions are not without philosophical interest, the one question which above all others 
has stimulated philosophical interest is explicitly non-technical and it can be expressed 
crudely as follows: Can a machine be said to think and, if so, in what sense? The issue has 
received much attention in the scholarly journals with articles and arguments appearing 
in great profusion, some resolutely answering this question in the affirmative, some, 
equally resolutely, answering this question in the negative, and others manifesting 
modified rapture. While the ramifications of the question are enormous I believe that the 
issue at the heart of the matter has gradually emerged from the forest of complications. 
It is easy to answer the question “Can machines/computers think?” Easy, that is, once 
we know with some degree of precision what thinking is, what machine/computers are, 
and, last but not least, how to understand the word “can.” The possibility of answering 
the question, “Can a computer think?” is rendered either question-beggingly trivial or 
mind-bogglingly impossible unless one is able to give some independent signification to 
its key terms. To define a computer as a sort of machine, and then to define machine in 
such a narrow way that it becomes meaningless to ask if it thinks viciously begs the 
question unless the definitions can be given independent justification. Of course, a 
similar consideration applies to arguments in favour of artificial intelligence. I assume 
that the majority of those who would put this question intend by “think” something like 
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“think in the way that human beings do or least in a sufficiently similar way.”2 The 
characterisation of the computer may also be problematic but for the purposes of this 
paper, I shall take it to be trouble-free. 
In his book. Minds, Brains and Machines, Geoffrey Brown remarks that, “If what we are 
after is a theory about the relation between the physical and mental aspects of machines, 
then this cannot be independent of some broader account of the relation between the 
mental and physical in general.”3 Having read much of the philosophical literature on 
artificial intelligence,4 I believe this point to be absolutely crucial. If the ancient dispute 
on the mind/body problem can be resolved, then the question as to the possibility of 
artificial intelligence almost answers itself; the position one adopts in regard to the 
mind/body problem significantly affects one’s views on the possibility of artificial 
intelligence. Tb set up the discussion I shall employ a taxonomy of the four basic 
positions which can be adopted towards the mind/body problem, a taxonomy derived 
from the writings of Mortimer Adler.5 
Mind/Body theories can be divided immediately into two basic kinds: immaterialistic 
or materialistic, each of which can be subdivided into an extreme and a moderate form. 
We then have four basic positions: extreme immaterialism [I], moderate immaterialism 
[2], moderate materialism [3], and extreme materialism [4]. Let us first of all contrast the 
extreme forms of both basic positions. The extreme immaterialist holds that the mind is 
an immaterial substance and that the body is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for its existence or operation. The extreme materialist, on the other hand, 
holds that the body and the mind are both existentially and analytically inseparable—the 
mind is ultimately an illusory entity and mental language is a convenient, although 
ontologically unreliable, mode of speech. The moderate forms of the two basic positions 
can be contrasted as follows. The moderate materialist holds that the body and the mind 
are existentially inseparable but analytically separable, that this separability is contingent, 
and that the body is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for the mind. The 
moderate immaterialist, while agreeing with the moderate materialist that the body is a 
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necessary condition for mind, simultaneously denies that it is a sufficient condition for 
mind. It is important to understand clearly that both moderate theories agree that human 
beings have the power of conceptual thought and that the body, that is, a suitably 
organised central nervous system, is a necessary condition for the mind. They disagree 
only on the question of whether the body is also a sufficient condition for the mind. 
Because the extreme version of a theory is more easily criticised than its moderate 
version, the tendency of partisans on both sides of the materialist/immaterialist divide is 
to focus on the extreme version of the other theory and to ignore the moderate version. 
Although the extreme immaterialism [1] has its defenders—classically in Plato and 
Descartes and more recently in Popper and Eccles6 —I shall not argue for or against it 
here; I simply assume its untenability. This leaves the positions of moderate 
immaterialism [2], moderate materialism [3], and extreme materialism [4]. Although there 
are those who believe extreme materialism to be philosophically untenable, a 
philosophical dead horse, as it were, there is no universal agreement on this point. If this 
horse has ever been dead then it must have miraculous powers of resurrection, for today 
it is alive and well and living under the name of Eliminative Materialism. 
I shall begin by presenting an argument intended to show not that extreme materialism 
is false, but that if it is true we can never assert that it is true, still less justify its assertion 
by means of rational argumentation. Having thus (I hope) disposed of position [4], I shall 
then present what I take to be the strongest argument for position [2] and I shall go on 
to conclude that, of the two moderate theories, moderate immaterialism [2] and 
moderate materialism [3], moderate immaterialism gives the more satisfactory account of 
human conceptual thought. Finally, I shall draw the consequences of this conclusion for 
the question of artificial intelligence, which are first, that the possibility of realising 
anything significantly resembling human intelligence in a non-living, non-conscious 
machines is extremely improbable, and second, that one’s position in regard to the 
possibility of artificial intelligence is determined largely by what one takes antecedently to 
be the most tenable theory in the philosophy of mind. I realise that my overall argument 
as is here presented is dialectically incomplete: to complete it I should be obliged not 
only to argue for moderate immaterialism, which I shall do, but I should also be obliged 
to refute both extreme immaterialism and moderate immaterialism explicitly, and this I 
have not attempted to do. The modest object of this paper is to re-present to a 
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contemporary audience what I take to be the strongest argument for moderate 
immaterialism, to indicate generally where the lines of discussion in the philosophy of 
mind should be drawn, and to relate issues in the philosophy of mind to the possibility of 
artificial intelligence. 
 
I 
Eliminative materialism is the most prominent version of extreme materialism at large 
today. In its psychological mode, eliminative materialism holds that the concepts of “folk 
psychology” are “mythical posits of a bad theory,”7 and are, as such, radically mistaken 
ways of construing the world of the mind. The eliminative materialist’s position is 
dominated by the assumption of the ultimate priority of scientific explanation 
understood in a reductive and physicalistic way. I believe that eliminative materialism in 
assigning this ultimate priority to scientific explanation generates an ineliminable 
paradox, for scientific explanation is genetically derived from, and is epistemically 
parasitic upon, our commonsense ways of going on, and cannot, without absurdity, be 
used to undermine radically such common-sense ways of going on. I stress “radically,” 
for I am not claiming that one has to accept everything one finds in common sense 
precisely as common sense presents it. But the challenge of eliminative materialism is to 
the entire structure of common-sense psychological concepts and not merely to 
particular parts of that structure. 
Why should we accept this assumption of the ultimate priority of scientific 
explanation? It does not appear to be a self-evident truth, and it can be, indeed it has 
been, denied. For example. Bishop Berkeley, in his own peculiar way, rejected this 
assumption. He denied that the philosophic-scientific conception of material substance 
could be used to call into question the ordinary modes of cognition upon which it itself 
was ultimately founded. It is one of the ironies of history, and should be a lesson to us 
all, that Berkeley, who regarded himself as the apostle of common-sense to the gentiles 
of proto-scientific materialism, should commonly be regarded as the most extravagant 
and paradoxical of philosophers! 
The nexus of common-sense psychological concepts must, I believe, be accorded a 
certain primacy. Against the eliminative materialists who generally claim that common 
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sense is just one (decaying!) theory among others and, as such, subject to refutation, I 
believe that the core of the common-sense conception is not just one theory among 
others but a conceptual framework which is the very condition of the intelligibility of any 
theory and which, as such, cannot be rejected without rejecting every other theory as 
well.8 
One very common claim by eliminative materialists is that the common-sense 
conception is explanatorily inadequate. In a famous passage in the Phaedo, Plato turns the 
tables on the physicalists and indicts them on the charge of explanatory failure.9 When 
Socrates was young, he had a passion for natural science. He puzzled over the following 
sorts of questions: 
Is it when heat and cold produce fermentation, as some have said, that living creatures are 
bred? Is it with the blood that we think, or with the air or the fire that is in us? Or is it 
none of these, but the brain that supplies our senses of hearing and sight and smell, and 
from these that memory and opinion arise, and from memory and opinion, when 
established, that knowledge comes? 
 
But, thinking on these things, Socrates became more and more puzzled. Then he heard 
of Anaxagoras who, it was said, claimed that it is the mind that produces order and is the 
cause of everything. Alas, poor Socrates was disappointed. When it came to the crunch, 
Anaxagoras made no use of causation by mind; instead, he “adduced causes like air and 
aether and water and many other absurdities.” It was as if someone were to claim that, 
The cause of everything that Socrates does is the mind—and then, in trying to account for 
my several actions, said first that the reason why I am lying here now is that my body is 
composed of bones and sinews, and that the bones are rigid and separated at the joints, 
but the sinews are capable of contraction and relaxation, and form and envelope for the 
bones with the help of the flesh and skin, the latter holding all together, and since the 
bones move freely in their joints the sinews by relaxing and contracting enable me 
somehow to bend my limbs, and this is the cause of my sitting here in a bent position. 
 
But, as Socrates points out, while such bodily dispositions are obviously necessary 
conditions of my posture, they are far from being sufficient. The real reason that 
Socrates is now sitting in prison awaiting execution is not that his bones and sinews are 
suitably disposed, but rather that he believes it to be more honourable to submit to the 
penalty imposed by his city than to run away. Socrates does not deny that there can be 
knowledge of bodily dispositions; he does deny, however, that such a knowledge would 
be such as to render otiose explanations in terms of reasons. 
                                                 
8 Trying to categorise the common-sense conception as just one theory among others is, I suggest, a 
categorical mistake akin to that committed by the man in Ryle's famous example who, having seen all the 
colleges and buildings at Oxford wanted to know where the University was. It is also very much like the 
erroneous interpretation of Aristotle's Ethics which situates eudaimonia, along with wealth, pleasure, etc. as 
one co-ordinate good among others.  
9 Phaedo 96ff. Popper comments on this in The Self and its Brain, 169ff. 
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 Not only is eliminative materialism explanatorily inadequate, it is also self-defeating.10 
The self defeating character of certain positions in philosophy has often been 
demonstrated; an illustration of the mode of argumentation involved in such a 
demonstration can be culled from Aristotle’s defence of the principle of non-
contradiction in the Metaphysics. 
There are some who....assert that it is possible for the same thing to be and not to 
be....[but] this is the most indisputable of principles. Some indeed have demanded that 
even this shall be demonstrated.... It is impossible that there should be a demonstration of 
everything.... We can....demonstrate negatively even that this view is impossible, if our 
opponent will only say something; and if he says nothing, it is absurd to seek to give an 
account of our views to one who cannot give an account of anything, in so far as he 
cannot do so. For such a man, as such, is from the start no better than a vegetable. Now 
negative demonstration I distinguish from demonstration proper, because in a 
demonstration one might be thought to be begging the question, but if another person is 
responsible for the assumption we shall have negative proof, not demonstration. The 
starting point for all such arguments is not the demand that our opponent shall say that 
something either is or is not for this one might perhaps take to be a begging of the 
question, but that he shall say something which is significant both for himself and for 
another; for this is necessary, if he really is to say anything. For, if he means nothing, such 
a man will not be capable of reasoning, either with himself or with another. But if any one 
grants this, demonstration will be possible; for we shall already have something definite. 
The person responsible for the proof, however, is not he who demonstrates but he who 
listens; for while disowning reason he listens to reason.11 
 
A similar dialectical argument can be marshalled against eliminative materialism. I agree 
with Lynne Rudder Baker when she says that, “To deny the common-sense conception 
of the mental is to abandon all our familiar resources for making sense of any claim, 
including the denial of the common-sense conception.”12 She continues, “If the thesis 
denying the common-sense conception is true, then the concepts of rational 
acceptability, of assertion, of cognitive error, even of truth and falsity are called into 
question.”13 
It seems that the eliminative materialist is faced with a dilemma; he must either 
abandon the assertion of, and the argument for, eliminative materialism, or he must 
continue to assert and argue for the eliminative materialism. If he abandons claim and 
argument then he loses by default; if he continues to assert and to argue, then the form 
of the assertion or argument commends eliminative materialism to our rational faculties 
                                                 
10 In connection with such arguments Baker makes the point that “arguments about the allegedly self-
defeating character of anything are, I think, frustrating to people on both sides of the issue. People on each 
side think that those on the other side miss the point. From my side, it seems that I ask straightforward 
questions...which require answers but receive none.” Lynne Rudder Baker, Saving Belief: A Critique of 
Physicialism (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), 137, n.  
11 Aristotle, Metaphysics, IV, 4 (1006al2ff). 
12 Baker, Saving Belief, 134. For essentially the same argument see Mortimer J. Adler, What Man Has Made of 
Man (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Company, 1937), 128-29, n. 4. 
13 Baker, Saving Belief, 134. 
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for evaluation, while the content of that assertion/argument explicitly denies that there 
can really be such a thing as rational evaluation.14 
Paul Churchland, in his 1980 article, admits that the self-defeating argument is very 
popular, and offers a refutation of it by means of a counterexample.15 Churchland claims 
that the argument is question-begging in that it assumes a certain theory of meaning 
which, along with other elements of folk psychology, it is the aim of the eliminativist to 
call into question. He offers a counterexample to illustrate this alleged question-begging: 
The Antivitalist says that there is no such thing as vital spirit. But this claim is self-refuting. 
The speaker can expect to be taken seriously only if his claim cannot. For if the claim is 
true, then the speaker does not have vital spirit and must be dead. But if he is dead, then 
his statement is a meaningless string of noises, devoid of reason and truth.16 
 
As both Baker and Popper point out, this alleged counterexample is 
disanalogous in a significant respect. As Popper puts it, 
The argument for vitalism [in the counterexample] relies on the truth of vitalism....thus the 
desired conclusion is in reality presupposed in the premise and the argument is circular.... 
In contrast, my argument for indeterminism relies not on the truth of free will but rather 
on the alleged truth of determinism, from which follows, deductively, the consequence 
that,  if the premise is true, any argument in its favour loses its effectiveness.17 
 
He goes on to note that he was not claiming that materialism was false, merely that it is 
self-defeating in that it cannot be supported by rational argument. 
Baker, in her analysis of Churchland’s counterexample, holds that both the antivitalist 
and the vitalist agree that being alive is a necessary condition for making a claim; they 
differ only in their conception of what it is to be alive. The situation is significantly 
different for the eliminative materialist. In the first place, he cannot consistently agree 
with his opponent ‘that having beliefs or other attitudes identified by content is a 
                                                 
14 Baker puts the dilemma as follows: “From the perspective that denies the common-sense conception, 
either he [the skeptic] can distinguish being 'justified* in 'accepting that p from being 'justified' in 
'accepting' that q or not. If not, then one is 'justified' in 'accepting' the thesis that denies the common-sense 
conception of the mental or any other thesis. But if so, then...the skeptic must absolve himself of the 
charge that he is covertly assuming contentful states by producing relevant content-free successors to 
concepts of acceptance and justification.” [Ibid., 136.] It is somewhat ironic that Darwin wrote in 1881 that 
it was his “innermost conviction” that *the universe is not the result of chance. But then, with me, the 
horrid doubt always arises whether convictions of man's mind which have developed from the mind of 
animals are of any great value or at all trustworthy. Would anyone trust in the conviction of a monkey's 
mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?” From a letter of July 3, 1881, cited in Francis Darwin's 
Charles Darwin: A Life (London, 1893), 68. For a very similar line of argument directed against the 
pragmatism of Rorty, the genealogy of Foucault, and the deconstruction of Derrida, from the perspective 
of contemporary critical theory, see chapters 1-4 of Thomas McCarthy's Ideals and Illusions: On Reconstruction 
and Deconstruction in Contemporary Critical Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991). 
15 This refutation is the same one provided by P. S. Churchland in “Is Determinism Self-Refuting?” Mind 
90 (1981): 100, to which Karl Popper replied in “Is Determinism Self-Refuting?” Mind 92, (1983): 103-04.  
16 Paul Churchland, “Eliminative Materialism and the Prepositional Attitudes,” The Journal of Philosophy 78 
(1981): 89-90. See also Patricia Smith Churchland, “Is Determinism Self-Refuting?” Mind 90 (1981): 100.  
17 Popper, “Is Determinism Self-Refuting?” 103. 
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necessary condition for making claims. The eliminative materialist is not offering a 
different account of what it is to have beliefs; he is denying that anyone has beliefs.”18 
Baker does not hesitate to call the vitalist/antivitalist counterexample “silly,” noting that 
the arguments would be parallel if the antivatalist were to hold that dead men make 
claims. In the second place, the antivitalist counter-argument fails in that whether 
antivitalism is true or false, the antivitalist cannot be charged with being dead. However, 
the original argument against the rational assertability of eliminative materialism assumes 
that eliminative materialism is true, and this can hardly beg the question if the point of 
the argument is to show that eliminative materialism is rationally non-assertable. 
Popper’s argument against materialism19 may be summarised as follows: the materialist 
holds that, for example, reasoning consists in “a certain kind of verbal behaviour and in 
acquiring dispositions to act and to speak.” Natural selection, positive and negative 
conditioning all play a role, as does schooling, which is just another form of conditioning. 
Now the materialist, faced with the problem of how to explain a mistake in, for example, 
logic, will say something like, ““these mistakes are to be explained by reference to the 
standards of logic, which standards are not abstract principles but merely those standards 
which the majority of logicians are disposed to accept.” The Popperian interlocutor 
replies, “Are the logicians so disposed because the principles are valid, or are the 
principles valid because the logicians are so disposed?” Whichever way the eliminative 
materialist turns he cannot avoid being impaled on the horns of a dilemma. If logicians 
are disposed to accept the principles of logic because the principles are valid then the 
validity of those principles is prior to the dispositions of the logician and cannot be 
explained in terms of such dispositions; if the principles of logic are valid simply because 
logicians are disposed to accept them then they lose all normative status. Depending thus 
on the logicians’ dispositions alone, the principles of logic would have no more standing 
or authority than any other consensual set of beliefs and could not be used as criteria of 
correctness in reasoning.20  
                                                 
18 Baker, Saving Belief, 139. 
19 Popper, The Self and its Brain, 76-81. 
20 As Morowitz noted “To underrate the significance of the appearance and character of reflective thought 
is a high price to pay in order to honour the liberation of science from theology by our reductionist 
predecessors several generations back. The human psyche is part of the observed data of science. We can 
retain it and still be good empirical biologists and psychologists.” Harold J. Morowitz, “Rediscovering the 
Mind,” Psychology Today (August 1980). Reprinted in Dennett and Hofstadter, The Mind's I, (London: 
Penguin Books, 1982), 34-42. (p. 42) 
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Baker summarises the cost of the eliminative materialist’s project.21 If eliminative 
materialism were true, then our ability to predict other people’s behaviour becomes 
inexplicable; commonplace interpersonal interactions becomes mysterious, as does what 
is said by us about such interactions; behaviour could never go wrong; almost every 
explanation ever given by an agent for his action would be false; there would be no 
distinction between telling lies and making honest mistakes; moral judgments would be 
false, or senseless; nothing would ever have matter to anybody; it would a total mystery, 
why we say the things we do; it would be a sheer miracle that we are systematically able 
to utter truths; reports of deliberation and decision would be false; what one does would 
be totally unrelated to what one reports one is doing; most sorts of psychology would 
become bogus; and the explananda of psychology would become problematic. 
I have now eliminated from consideration both extreme immaterialism and extreme 
materialism, the former by fiat, and the latter by means of the argument from self-
refutation. This leaves the two moderate theories in possession. How, then, are we to 
discriminate between them? (It should be noted in passing that almost all the current 
debate in the philosophy of artificial intelligence is a family dispute within the materialist 
camp, that is, within positions [3] and [4]. Many of the objections to the reductive 
analysis of intentionality which we find exhibited in [4] come from people such as 
Chisholm, Price, and latterly, Searle, all of whom inhabit position [3]. To satisfy ourselves 
that Searle is a materialist of the position [3] variety we have only to note that he has as 
one of his perennial axioms the following: Brains cause minds and they do so entirely.22 
This is clearly equivalent to holding that the body is both a necessary and a sufficient 
condition for mind.) 
                                                 
21 Baker, Saving Belief, 130-33. 
22 This is Premise I in Minds, Brains and Science (1984) and Axiom 4 in “Is the Brain's Mind a Computer 
Program?” Scientific American, 262 (January 1990). 
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II 
Now I want to turn my attention to a positive argument for moderate immaterialism as 
against moderate materialism. The relevance of this argument to the question of artificial 
intelligence is that if moderate materialism is tenable then the possibility of a computer’s 
being able to think is much more conceivable whereas if moderate immaterialism is 
tenable then it becomes very difficult to sustain a plausible argument for artificial 
intelligence in any interesting sense. 
What would an argument against the possibility of a computer’s being able to think 
look like? In very general terms it would have to look something like this: 
Premise 1.      Xs [don’t] [can’t] think 
Premise 2.      Computers are Xs 
Conclusion.    Computers [don’t] [can’t] think 
 
In this argument, “computer” can be taken to be unproblematic. “Thinking,” on the 
other hand, if it is to be philosophically interesting, needs to be understood in terms of 
intellectual knowledge and not just sensation or perception. Classical and mediaeval 
philosophers, by and large, regarded thinking as the activity of a particular part of the 
soul. According to this view, thinking comprised three distinct activities; 
conceptualisation, reasoning, and judging. These activities were together sharply 
distinguished from sensation/perception. If the argument I am about to present is to 
succeed at all, the distinction between thought or conceptual knowledge, on the one 
hand, and perception or sensory knowledge, on the other, must be maintained. How 
then might the distinction between conceptual and perceptual knowledges be 
characterised? In this way: knowledge produced by sensation/perception is ineluctably 
particular; intellectual knowledge is ineluctably universal. Descartes illustrates the 
distinction between sensation/perception and intellection in the Meditations in terms of 
the distinction between imaginability and conceivability: 
When I imagine a triangle, not only do I conceive it to be a figure made up of three lines, 
but I also, by the strength and interior application of my mind, contemplate these three 
lines as present • and this is just what I call imagining. But if I want to think of a chiliagon. 
I can conceive that it is a figure made up of a thousand sides just as easily as I conceive 
that a triangle is a figure made up only of three sides but I cannot imagine the thousand 
sides of a chiliagon as I can the three sides of a triangle, for I cannot regard them as 
present with the eye of the mind. And although, following my habitual mode of imagining 
corporeal things, I were to represent to my some figure or other confusedly when thinking 
of a chiliagon, nevertheless it is obvious that this confused figure would not be a chiliagon, 
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for it would not differ in any way from what I would represent to myself were I to think of 
a myriagon or any other many-sided figure.23 
 
In our argument, then, we are, in classical Aristotelian style, looking for a middle term 
which will provide the reason which will enable us to assert our conclusion; we are 
looking not just for the fact, but for the reasoned fact. Now, what could we put for the X 
in the above argument? Perhaps the middle term could “emotionless beings” or 
“uncreative beings.” It is difficult to see how one could get a noninvidious argument 
going along these lines, for the choice of such a middle term immediately prejudices the 
conclusion. What if the middle term were “physical systems?” This suggestion looks 
more promising. The problem with this term, however, is soon apparent, for it is far too 
wide in scope and is susceptible to refutation by counterexample. Human beings are 
physical systems (at least) and they manifestly think, so any argument which attempts to 
refute the claim that computers can think at the cost of denying that human beings can 
think must be deemed to be gratuitously counter-intuitive. What if the middle term were 
“purely physical system?” This would defeat the counterexample only if we are willing to 
defend the position that human beings are more than purely physical systems and were 
prepared to indicate, at least in a preliminary way, what this more might be. What if the 
middle term were ‘‘things which cannot be represent?” This is easily refutable by 
counterexample. If a book can be said to represent and if such a claim is not obviously 
incomprehensible, the so too can a computer represent. What if the middle term were 
amended to "things which cannot originally represent?” This would avoid the 
counterexample, but at the cost of committing us to some account of what it is for a 
system to represent originally.24 We might parse “originally represent” in terms of the 
                                                 
23 Rene Descartes, Meditations Metaphysiques, (Paris: Librairie Larousse): “Lorsque j'imagine un triangle, non 
selulement je concois que c'est une figure composee de trois lignes, mais avec cela j'envisage ces trois lignes 
comme presentes par la force et 1'aapplication interieure de mon esprit; et c'est proprement ce que j'appelle 
imaginer. Que si je veux penser a un chiliogone, je concois bien a la verite que c'est une figure composee de 
mille cotes seulement; mais je ne puis pas imaginer les milles cotes d'un chiliogone comme je fais les trois 
d'un triangle, ni pour ainsi dire les regarder comme presents avec les yeux de mon esprit. Et quoique, 
suivant la coutume que j'aai de me servir toujours de mon imagination lorsque je pense aux choses 
corporelles, il arrive qu'en concevant un chiliogone je me represente confusement quelque figure, toutefois 
il est tres evident que cette figure n'est point un chiliogone, puisque'elle ne differe nullement de celle que je 
me representerais si je pensais a un myriogone ou a quelque autre figure de beaucoup de cotes [Meditation 
Sixieme].  
24 Daniel Dennett, in The Intentional Stance (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1989) chapters 7 and 8, has an argument 
against this position to the effect that the evidence warrants us neither allowing that both human beings 
and computers originally represent, or that neither human beings nor computers do. The question of 
original intentionality arises here. His argument appears to run in two directions. 
A.  1. If computers are not original intenders, then neither are human beings, 
 2. Computers are not original intenders, therefore 
 3. Human beings are not original intenders, 
or 
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possession of concepts (as distinct from precepts). Again, there seems to be some sense 
in which computers can possess concepts, albeit in a derivative way, so we might have to 
parse “originally represent” in terms of the generation of concepts. As against this, it 
might be claimed that while classical AI programs cannot generate concepts, Parallel 
Distributed Processing programs can.25 Tb block this move we should have either to 
deny that PDP programs can generate concepts (perhaps because the generation of 
concepts presupposes consciousness and consciousness presupposes life) or accept that 
they can do so and continue the search for a significant difference. 
One point that has to be explained (or explained away) by any reductionist account is 
the commonsense apprehension of a difference between the physical realm and the 
psychical realm, the physical realm being constituted by dyadic forms of energy 
interchange whereas the psychical realm involves, in its cognitive dimension, a triadic 
relation between the knower, the known, and the means of knowing. Consciousness is 
often taken to be the characteristic manifestation of the psychic realm. In the next few 
pages, I shall attempt to show that, from Aristotle to Nagel, philosophers have taken 
seriously the difference between the realms of the physical and the psychic and have 
attempted to characterise and account for this difference in remarkably similar ways. 
In the treatise, De Anima, we find Aristotle discussing what I take to be an incipient 
notion of consciousness.26 In the second book of that work, Aristotle seems to give us 
two accounts of aisthesis: in the early chapters of book II aisthesis is presented as a kind of 
alteration or change; in the later chapters (chapter 12 in particular) aisthesis is presented as 
the reception of form without matter.27 There is much scholarly dispute as to whether 
these seemingly different accounts of aisthesis really are different, or whether they are 
complementary aspects of a unified whole. I incline to the latter interpretation. Now the 
alteration account of aisthesis is clearly a version of what I have been calling dyadic energy 
                                                                                                                                            
B.  1. If computers are not original intenders, then neither are human beings 
 2. Human beings are original intenders, therefore 
 3. Computers are original intenders. 
Dennett seems to be forcing us to accept either that neither machines nor human beings are original 
intenders, or that both machines and human beings are original intenders.  
25 D. E. Rumelhart, J. L. McClelland and the PDP Research Group, Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations 
in the Microstructure of Cognition Vol. 1, Foundations (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986).  
26 See, however, the introduction to the Penguin Classics' version of the De Anima, translated and 
introduced by Hugh Lawson-Tancred, who considers such attempts to detect an account of consciousness 
in Aristotle to be irremediably anachronistic.  
27 The Greek term aisthesis covers not only what would be referred to in English as either sensation or 
perception, but also what we would term consciousness. This is one of those very rare cases in which 
English makes more verbal and, one hopes, real distinctions than does Greek.. 
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interchange, and it goes without saying that some such process is necessary if aisthesis is 
to take place. The form-without-matter account of aisthesis, while being compatible with 
the alteration account, goes beyond it. In this account Aristotle is establishing the fairly 
obvious point that in grasping an entity cognitively, one does not receive in the cognitive 
power everything that pertains to that entity in reality, just its formal dimensions. It is 
quite true to say of Aristotle, as some commentators do, that in the sensory organ 
receives an entity’s form without that entity’s matter but with the matter of the sensitive 
organ. However, if this is taken to be all that happens in aisthesis then one must quarrel 
with the commentators. If the form received from an entity informs the sensitive organ 
in precisely the same way in which it informs the entity, then a mere physical change has 
taken place in the sense organ which would then become that entity in a physical manner. 
But, as Aristotle is at some pains to point out, the sense organ does not become the 
sense object in all its physical reality. What is unique to the change or alteration that is 
aisthesis is that something, call it awareness, call it consciousness, supervenes upon the 
undeniable physical immutation which takes place in the sense organ. The physical 
immutation of the sense organ, then, is clearly a necessary condition of aisthesis, but it is 
not at all obvious that it is its sufficient condition. So far as the evidence will take us it 
seems that only living beings are capable of becoming cognitively aware of their 
environment consequent upon the requisite physiological stimulation. The sun shines 
indifferently  upon me and upon a rock and warms us both, but only I am cognitively 
aware of the sun. 
Whatever problems there may be in arguing for the necessity of a supra-physical 
cognitive capacity on the level of aisthesis, when it comes to the operation of mind or 
intellect Aristotle is in no doubt whatsoever that it is essentially an immaterial capacity. 
Mind in order to know must be pure from all admixture; for the co-presence of what is 
alien to its nature is a hindrance and a block: it follows that it too, like the sensitive part, 
can have no nature of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity. Thus, that in 
the soul which is called mind (by mind I mean that whereby the soul thinks and judges) is, 
before it thinks, not actually any real thing.28 
 
Aristotle’s account is not merely of historical interest. In 1953 Michael Scriven held that 
the capacity for complex behaviour is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
consciousness. He held then that from our experience we hold that life too is a necessary 
condition of consciousness, and hence, that while we can decide if living things are 
conscious on the basis of their behaviour, we cannot do this for non-living things. The 
                                                 
28 De Anima, 429al8n1 
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paradox lies in the fact that while the behaviour of human beings seems to be duplicable, 
there nevertheless seem to be descriptions of human behaviour which can never properly 
be applicable to machines. Scriven believed that this paradox could be resolved by noting 
that while human beings have no transcendent element, neither can machines ever be 
conscious because, as he puts it, “we have come to see that a reproduction of a man 
sufficiently exact to be conscious is too exact to be still a machine.” He goes on to note 
that, “Consciousness is not a property which can be detected in a machine by any 
physical examination, because it cannot be identified with any physical characteristics of a 
machine. Nor can it even be correlated with them, as the colour red can be correlated 
with certain wavelengths of light.”29 
In his seminal article, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” Turing considered an 
objection to the possibility of a computer’s being able to think based on its alleged 
incapacity to be conscious. 
Not until a machine can write a sonnet or compose a concerto because of thought and 
emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, could we agree that machine equals 
brain—that is, not only write it, but know that it had written it. No mechanism could feel 
(and not merely artificially signal, an easy contrivance) pleasure at its successes, grief when 
its valves fuse, be warmed by flattery, be made miserable by its mistakes, be charmed by 
sex, be angry or depressed when it cannot get what it wants.30 
 
While unwilling to accept this argument as having any force against his “imitation game” 
Turing does admit that he does not wish “to give the impression that I think there is no 
mystery about consciousness. There is, for instance, something of a paradox connected 
with any attempt to localise it.”31  
The most well known defender of the claim that consciousness must be taken seriously 
in any account of genuine knowledge is Thomas Nagel. He writes, 
While an account of the physical basis of mind must explain many things, this 
[consciousness] appears to be the most difficult. It is impossible to exclude the 
phenomenological features of experience from a reduction in the same way that one 
                                                 
29 See Scriven, p. 36, and p. 39. See also J. R. Lucas who, in “Minds, Machines and Godel” argues that 
Godel's theorem proves that Mechanism is false. He says that. The paradoxes of consciousness arise 
because a conscious being can be aware of itself, as well as of other things, and yet cannot really construe 
as being divisible into parts. It means that a conscious being can deal with Godelian questions in a way in 
which a machine cannot, because a conscious being can both consider itself and its performance and yet 
not be other that which did the performance. A machine can be made in a manner of speaking to 'consider' 
its own performance, but it cannot take this 'into account' without thereby becoming a different machine, 
namely the old machine with a 'new part' added. But it is inherent in our idea of a conscious mind that it 
can reflect upon itself and criticize its own performances, and no extra part is required to do this: it is 
already complete, and has no Achilles heel.” [p. 57]  
30 Alan Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” in Alan R. Anderson (ed.). Minds and Machines 
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 17. Turing's paper was originally published in Mind 59 
(1950). The argument cited by Turing is taken from Professor Jefferson's “Lister Oration.”  
31 Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” 18. 
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excludes the phenomenal features of an ordinary substance from a physical or chemical 
reduction of it — namely, by explaining them as effects on the minds of human observers 
(cf. Rorty 1965). If physicalism is to be defended, the phenomenological features must 
themselves be given a physical account. But when we examine their subjective character it 
seems that such a result is impossible. The reason is that every subjective phenomenon is 
essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, 
physical theory will abandon that point of view.32  
 
It seems clear from the foregoing that a central element of the task of the defender of 
artificial intelligence will be to separate the notion of consciousness from that of 
knowing. If this can be done the idea of artificial intelligence becomes much more 
plausible. Can this separation be effected in such a way as to retain a rich and 
philosophically interesting concept of thought? I do not think so. Knowledge without 
consciousness is Hamlet without the Prince!33 
Leaving to one side the question of whether and to what extent sensory cognition 
demands the presence within the knower of a supraphysical capacity, and shelving for the 
time being considerations having to do with the intrinsic relation between consciousness 
and knowledge, I wish now to present in brief an argument to the effect that such a 
supra-physical (or immaterial) capacity is a sine qua non for intellectual knowledge. As this 
argument has been around, in one form or another, for quite some time (it has its roots 
in the writings of Aristotle and St. Thomas) I am obviously making no claim to 
originality. In the form in which I present it here the argument is immediately derived 
from a presentation by Mortimer Adler.34 
The argument in its bare bones hinges on two propositions. The first proposition asserts 
that the concepts whereby we understand what different kinds of classes of things are like 
consists in meanings or intentions that are universal. The second proposition asserts that 
nothing that exists physically is actually universal; anything that is embodied in matter 
exists as an individual; and as such it can be a particular instance of this class or that. From 
these two propositions, the conclusion follows that our concepts must be immaterial. If 
they were acts of a bodily organ such as the brain, they would exist in matter, and so 
would be individual; but they are universal; hence they do not and cannot exist in matter, 
and the power of conceptual thought by which we form and use concepts must be an 
immaterial power, i.e., one the acts of which are not the acts of a bodily organ.35 
                                                 
32 Thomas Nagel, “What is it Like to be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review 83 (1974). Reprinted in Hofstadter 
and Dennett's The Mind’s I (London: Penguin Books, 1982).  
33 A possible objection to my linking of consciousness and knowledge can, in these post-Freudian days, be 
mounted on the basis of the possibility of unconscious knowledge. I would, as a matter of fact, be 
prepared to accept the possibility of such unconscious knowledge, but only as essentially related to and as 
ultimately derived from consciousness in the first place. For an idea of the position which I would in 
essence defend in this regard, see n. 55, 218-24 of Mortimer Adler's What Man Has Made of Man (New 
York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1937). 
34 Mortimer Adler, “Intentionality and Immateriality,” The New Scholasticism 41 (1967): 312-44; The 
Immateriality of Conceptual Thought,” The New Scholasticism 41 (1967): 489-97.  
35 Adler, “Intentionality and Immateriality,” 336. Adler notes rather tartly that “So far as I can judge from 
my own fairly extensive reading of contemporary literature on this subject, the argument is totally 
unknown.” As an instance of this ignorance he cites Feigenbaum and Feldman's claim in Computers and 
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The argument in this passage is more complex than Adler would have us believe. If we 
examine the passage we can see that in fact Adler is presenting the argument in two 
distinct forms. In its first form it is a categorical syllogism; in its second, a hypothetical 
syllogism. Let us set it out explicitly in both forms. 
Categorical Syllogism: 
1. No physical being is actually universal 
2. Concepts are actual universals, therefore 
3. Concepts are not physical beings. 
 
This syllogism is Cesare, and is valid. 
Hypothetical Syllogism: 
4. If a concept were an act of a bodily organ, it would exist 
in matter and hence be individual. 
5. A concept is universal (i.e., not individual), hence, 
6. A concept is not an act of a bodily organ. 
 
This argument is again valid (by Modus Tollendo Tollens.) 
The conclusions of both arguments (3) and (6) are effectively equivalent and we may 
treat them as one, namely, (6) “a concept is not an act of a bodily organ.” From this 
conclusion, Adler draws as a corollary the point he really wants to establish, namely that 
7. The power of conceptual thought (the power by which we form and use concepts) is an 
immaterial power. 
 
This, however, is not equivalent to (6), nor is it immediately obvious how we might 
derive it therefrom. One way to do it appears to be as follows. We can immediately 
conclude from (6), by means of eduction by complex conception that, 
8. That power whose acts are concepts is not a power whose acts are the acts of a bodily 
organ.36 
 
If we now define “immaterial power” as “a power the acts of which are not the acts of a 
bodily organ,” we can generate, 
9. That power whose acts are concepts is an immaterial power. 
 
If we accept what would seem to be a self-evident truth, namely that, 
10. The power of conceptual thought is the power whose acts are concepts 
                                                                                                                                            
Thought (New York, 1963), 8, that no evidence, argument, or proof has ever been advanced against the 
possibility of a computer's eventually becoming able to do whatever it is that a human mind does. 
36 In a fully developed argument it would be necessary to distinguish clearly between the ontological, the 
psychological, and the logical dimensions of human knowledge.. 
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and substitute appropriately in (9) then we have 
(7) the power of conceptual thought is an immaterial power. 
 
Those who would refute this argument must show either that it is invalid, or that it is 
unsound. It appears to be valid, and I take it to be so. Whether or not it is sound 
depends upon the truth of its premises, and I cannot establish that here. 
 
III 
What is the relevance of this argument for moderate immaterialism to the topic of 
artificial intelligence? Simply this: If conceptual knowledge is the product of an 
immaterial power, and if this immaterial power virtually requires (while yet transcending 
them) the properties of life and consciousness, then there is no cogent support for the 
view that computers, which are non-living, non-conscious entities, entities which give, 
moreover, no evidence of an ability to form or employ concepts, will ever be able to 
know in anything like a human sense. 
The improbability of discovering that computers can think is underscored by the failure 
to discover in chimpanzees a capacity for prepositional language, despite the fact that 
chimpanzees, unlike computers, are alive, are conscious, are possessed of obvious 
cognitive powers, and have been the beneficiaries of intensive and exhaustive training, 
the like of which is given to no human infant. Impressed by the ability of vocally 
incapacitated human beings to communicate with others by means of signs, the 
eighteenth century philosopher de la Mettrie, had the following inspiration: 
Would it be absolutely impossible to teach this animal [the ape] a language? I do not think 
so. I should choose a large ape in preference to any other, until by chance another kind 
should be discovered, more like us, for nothing prevents there being such a one in regions 
unknown to us....I should not want it to be too young or too old; for apes that are brought 
to Europe are usually too old. I would choose the one with the most intelligent face, and 
the one which, in a thousand little ways, best lived up to its look of intelligence....apes see 
and hear, they understand what they hear and see, and grasp so perfectly the signs that are 
made to them, that I doubt not that they would surpass the pupils of Amman [Johann 
Conrad Amman, 1669-c. 1730] in any other game or exercise. Why then should the 
education of monkeys be impossible? Why might not the monkey, by dint of great pains, 
at last imitate after the manner of deaf mutes, the motions necessary for pronunciation?37 
 
When the idea of investigating the possibility of an animal’s speaking was rediscovered in 
the twentieth century, attempts were made to get chimpanzees to vocalise. The result was 
                                                 
37 Julien Offray de la Mettrie, Man a Machine, (Leyden, 1748; Open Court French-English edition, 1912), 
100-01.  
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a miserable failure.38 De la Mettrie’s research strategy was rediscovered by the Gardners, 
by D. Premack, and by D. M. Rumbaugh in the 1960s. Various sub-strategies were 
devised. The chimpanzee Washoe was allegedly taught a version of American Sign 
Language (Ameslan); Lana was taught to enter sequences at a console; and Sarah was 
taught to manipulate items on a visual display. The early reports were astounding; it 
seemed as if the chimps were able to manifest a linguistic ability comparable to that of 
children. However, as time passed and the initial flurry of excitement subsided significant 
differences emerged in the interpretation accorded to the chimpanzees’ activities. For 
example, some researchers began to modify their original claims regarding the 
chimpanzee’s linguistic ability. In 1977, Rumbaugh was claiming for chimpanzees not 
language but what he called the requisites of linguistic competence.39 And in 1976 
Premack began to replace talk of language with talk of the cognitive preconditions of 
language.40 Other researchers continued to produce enthusiastic reports. Some critics, 
while they were prepared to grant that the apes manifested some linguistic skills, 
nevertheless, considered them to be trivial. Other critics questioned the validity of the 
data on the chimpanzee’s performances. According to some, experiments were not 
accurately described.41 This was perhaps more the case with earlier reports than with later 
ones. One major line of criticism alleged that the methodological inadequacies of these 
experiments (for example, the problem of cueing) were either insuperable or else 
sufficiently endemic to invalidate many of the reports.42 Inadequate or partial reporting 
of experimental circumstances was a very serious problem with the sign-language 
projects. According to Seidenberg, the reports of Washoe, Koko are anecdotal and 
                                                 
38 K. J. Hayes and C. Hayes, The Intellectual Development of a Home-Raised Chimpanzee,” Proceedings of 
the American Philosophical Society 95 (1951), 105-09. A useful anthology of articles in this area is Thomas A. 
Sebeok and Jean Umiker-Sebeok (eds.). Speaking of Apes: A Critical Anthology of Two-Way Communication with 
Man (New York and London: Plenum Press, 1980). This collection contains articles by Kellogg, 
Lenneberg, Brown, Bronowski & Bellugi, McNeill, Mounin, Terrace & Bever, Limber, Rumbaugh, Fouts & 
Rigby, Gardner & Gardner, Chomsky, and others. Also, see Martin Gardner, “How Well can Animals 
Converse?” Semiotica 38 (1982): 357-67; Robert J. McLaughlin, “Language and Man: Aristotle Meets 
Koko,” The Thomist 45 (1981): 541-70; and Mark S. Seidenberg, “Aping Language,” Semiotica 44 (1983): 177-
94. 
39 D. M. Rumbaugh (ed.). Language Learning by a Chimpanzee: The Lana Project (New York: Academic Press, 
1977).  
40 D. Premack, Intelligence in Ape and Man (Hillsdale, NJ.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1976). 
41 C. A. Risteau and D. Robbins, “A Threat to Man's Uniqueness? Language and Communication in the 
Chimpanzee,” Journal of Psycholinguistic Research 8(1979): 267-300; H. S. Terrace, “Is Problem-
Solving Language?” Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior 31 (1979): 161-75; M. S. 
Seidenberg and L. A. Petitto, “Signing Behavior in Apes: A Critical Review,” Cognition 7, (1979), 
177-215.  
42 Thomas A. Sebeok and Jean Umiker-Sebeok (eds.). Speaking of Apes: A Critical Anthology of Two-Way 
Communication with Man (New York, 1980).  
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unsystematic.43 Another line of criticism alleged that there were conceptual inadequacies 
of various kinds operating in the research. An example of one such problem was the very 
peculiar practices of scoring Washoe correct in her answers if they were in the correct 
category. For example, if she were asked to select, say, a banana, and she actually selected 
an apple, this response counted as correct, because bananas and apples were taken to 
belong to the same category! Still another line of criticism, applying a version of 
Ockham’s razor, claimed that the chimpanzees’ behaviour could be adequately 
interpreted without attributing linguistic skills to them. 
The most serious problem, from a philosophical point of view, is what has been called 
the “Clever Hans” effect. In a Clever Hans situation, an animal is trained to produce a 
form of behaviour which is uncharacteristic for that species and appears, moreover, to be 
of a kind which is specifically human. Now, the problem with a comparative study of 
behaviour is that the researcher can always find a point of comparison provided only that 
the desired form of activity is defined in a sufficiently narrow way. If all that matters is 
the output of the entities to be compared, and if a sufficiently constrained definition of 
what constitutes a certain kind of activity is accepted, then there is no difficulty in 
identifying the two behaviours as being of the same kind. 
Hans could be said to be able to add if we merely define this skill as ‘being able to indicate 
the amount that results when two numbers are added together.’ Similarly, Skinner’s ping- 
pong playing pigeons could be said to play the game if it is narrowly conceived as *being 
able to volley a certain type of spheroid across a net.’ In just this way, apes are said to have 
acquired language, or the ‘rudiments of linguistic skill,’ because of the crude signing 
behaviours they display.44 
 
But, as Seidenberg goes on to point out 
These animals could be said to possess the relevant human skills (being able to add, play 
ping-pong, talk) only if they are construed so narrowly as to ignore their important aspects. 
Characteristically, a person who can add is not dependent on cues from other people (as 
was Hans); the person who plays ping-pong keeps score and tries to win (unlike a pigeon); 
the person who talks does not merely emit signs, but rather follows a large set of linguistic 
and social conventions (unlike apes). 
 
This switch between literal and metaphorical uses of terms we may call “creeping 
literalism.” A term which is used paradigmatically in a human context, such as 
“language,” is applied to a specified range of animal behaviour, originally in a 
                                                 
43. Seidenberg, “Signing Behavior in Apes,” 183-84 
44 Seidenberg, “Aping Language,” 187. 
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metaphorical (or at best analogical) sense. Soon, however, the quotation marks disappear, 
and the originally metaphorical or analogical use of the term has now become literal.45 
Michael Scriven notices this problem too. “At first as slang, then seriously, these 
machines will be called intelligent.”46 In such a case, Scriven argues that the word has 
changed its meaning if considered to be applicable to computers. He notes that a 
machine operated by an intelligent being does not thereby become intelligent, any more 
than the human brain, which is a physiological organism. It is the creature which is 
intelligent not its brain. The ape researchers cannot have it both ways. If they begin by 
investigating whether apes possess the skill which in humans is termed “naming” then it 
becomes obvious that the apes differ from more than they resemble humans. If the skill 
is operationally defined in some restricted way, then the evidence for the ape’s possession 
of it is much higher; now, however, it no longer is significantly similar to what human 
beings do. I suggest that the failure of the research project to discover specifically 
humanoid intelligence in chimpanzees, despite their possession of life and consciousness 
(which I take to be necessary conditions of intelligence) underscores the radical 
implausibility of the research project to discover humanoid intelligence in machines, 
which are neither living nor conscious. 
To conclude: if the moderate immaterialist position in the philosophy of mind is more 
defensible than the moderate materialist position, then, given the presence of life and 
consciousness in all the entities which we would unequivocally recognise as capable of 
exercising knowledge, life and consciousness could then reasonably be held to be a 
necessary condition of cognition. If this is so we have no reason to believe that a 
computer will ever be able to know, unless it too becomes capable of life and 
consciousness. Furthermore if, as the moderate immaterialist position claims, an 
immaterial power is an additional necessary precondition of intellectual knowledge in 
material beings, then we have no reason to suppose computers will ever become capable 
                                                 
45 Dennett presents an account of three stances which we can adopt towards any complex system; physical, 
design, and intentional. No problem arises with his notion of a physical stance. If we adopt the design 
stance we refer to the intentions or purposes of the designer of the artifact. Again, this is unproblematic. It 
is with the notion of an intentional stance that the problem of creeping literalism can occur for this 
involves alluding to the “intentions” of the entity under scrutiny. 
46 Michael Scriven, The Mechanical Concept of Mind,” Mind 62 (1953): 36; reprinted in Alan Ross 
Anderson, Minds and Machines (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964). 
 
 
 21 
of such knowledge  unless it can be shown that computers are capable of becoming, in 
effect, human.47 
 
                                                 
47 A parallel approach to the problem I have been dealing with here is the one bearing on what is called 
“propositional attitudes.” I cannot deal with it here, except to say that the classical view accounts for 
cognitive content by means of the notion of form. Form determines both the knower and the known 
though it does so in distinctly different ways. Because it is the principle of both it can serve, on the one 
hand, to inform matter and be co-constitutive real being, and, at the same time, inform the cognitive 
powers and be co-constitutive of knowledge. 
Our account has to explain how our knowledge is at once ours, and yet is about something other than 
ourselves. The notion of form, and the theory of abstraction and the role of the phantasmata in cognition, 
go some way towards supplying an explanation. Thought has to be “of” its objects, and yet it must “belong 
to” the thinker. A balance must be maintained between these two cognitive demands in any adequate 
theory. Over-emphasis on the “of” results in a form of sensism tied so closely to the world that it simply 
seems to be a form of elaborate reaction to circumstances with no genuine cognitive element; over-
emphasis on the “belong to” ends up in constructivism.  
On the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis or any of its latter day equivalents, how is intentionality 
possible? A thing is a thing. By itself, it is not “of” or “about” anything. Nothing is gained by piling things 
higher and higher, or in more complex shapes or patterns; what is required is something different, not 
more of the same. For more on intentionality, see Gerard Casey “Intentionality and Immateriality,” in Fran 
O’Rourke (ed.) At the Heart of the Real (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1992), 97-112. 
